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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-2161 
______________ 
 
RICHARD T. BALSAVAGE 
 
v. 
 
JOHN E. WETZEL, SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS; DEBRA SAUERS, SUPERINTENDANT OF THE STATE 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT FOREST; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF 
THE COUNTY OF BERKS; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
        
                             The District Attorney of the County of Berks, 
                                                                                                Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5-11-cv-05817) 
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 15, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard T. Balsavage was convicted of sexually abusing children.  He was 
sentenced to prison followed by a period of probation.  He violated a condition of 
probation and was sentenced to an additional period in prison.  After successfully 
obtaining post-conviction relief on his sentence for the probation violation, he was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment seven times greater than his original probation 
violation sentence.  He filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the 
new sentence was vindictively motivated by his appeals of the sentencing judge’s rulings.  
The District Court agreed, granted the petition, and ordered the reimposition of the 
original probation violation sentence.  We will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
the petition but vacate the order as to the remedy imposed. 
I. 
 As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Balsavage was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Pennsylvania of eight counts of sexual abuse of children in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6312(d) and was sentenced to 9 to 23 months’ imprisonment.  Shortly after his release 
from prison, he violated the conditions of his probation.  At the probation revocation 
hearing, the court [the “Gagnon court”]1 heard testimony from prison officials, 
                                                 
1
 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Supreme Court defined the due 
process rights of individuals accused of violating the conditions of their probation or 
parole.  The phrase “Gagnon court” is sometimes used to refer to the court that presides 
over state probation and parole revocation proceedings. 
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counselors, and Balsavage’s former cellmate, which indicated Balsavage’s deviancy, 
danger to the community, and inability to be treated.  The Gagnon court stated that 
Balsavage was “not amenable to treatment” and, citing the need for punishment and to 
protect children and the community at large, sentenced him to 3 ½ to 7 years’ 
imprisonment [the “original sentence”].  App. 82-83.   
 Balsavage appealed and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.  Balsavage 
then filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act [“PCRA”], 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§9541-46, arguing, among other things, that he was denied his right of 
allocution during the original violation sentencing hearing.  The Gagnon court granted 
Balsavage’s PCRA petition and convened a resentencing hearing.   
 At the resentencing hearing, Balsavage exercised his right of allocution and 
thanked the court, admitted responsibility for his actions, and expressed remorse.  The 
Gagnon court observed that there was “very little that - - virtually nothing that’s new or 
different from the time of the prior sentencing, as far as the background information.”  
App. 234.  The Gagnon court proceeded to question Balsavage, and Balsavage responded 
that: (1) since his prior sentencing hearing, he had been imprisoned and therefore lacked 
access to children or materials related to children; (2) before his initial term of 
imprisonment, he had victimized a total of thirteen children; (3) he did not cooperate with 
the Sexual Offender Assessment Board at the time of his initial conviction, which 
resulted in a finding that he was not a sexually violent predator; and (4) contrary to the 
testimony of his probation officer, he did not harbor fantasies of murdering 
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schoolchildren.  In imposing the new sentence, the Gagnon court considered the need to 
protect the public, the gravity of Balsavage’s offense, and his rehabilitative needs, as well 
as “the fact that [Balsavage] appealed every decision and sentence this Court ever 
imposed on [him].”  App. 236.  The Gagnon court sentenced Balsavage to 24 ½ to 49 
years’ imprisonment, a sevenfold increase from his original sentence.   
 Balsavage filed a Motion to Modify Sentence, which was denied.  Balsavage 
appealed his sentence to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing, among other 
things, that his increased sentence was an unconstitutional deprivation of due process in 
that it was imposed in retaliation for exercising his appellate rights.  Relying exclusively 
on Pennsylvania law, the Superior Court affirmed.  Balsavage filed a Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was denied.  
 Balsavage thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, arguing that his sentence of 24 ½ to 49 years’ imprisonment was the product of 
judicial vindictiveness and therefore violated his due process rights as articulated in 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).  The District Court conditionally granted 
Balsavage’s petition, ordering that a writ of habeas corpus would issue unless he was 
resentenced within 120 days to a term of imprisonment not to exceed the original term of 
3 ½ to 7 years.  The Berks County District Attorney appealed.
2
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 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Because the District 
Court decided Balsavage’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our 
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II. 
 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
[“AEDPA”], 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect 
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 
unless the adjudication of the claim— 
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Section 2254(d) requires a petitioner to show that: (1) “the state 
court decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court”; (2) “the state court judgment rests upon an objectively unreasonable 
application of clearly established Supreme Court jurisprudence”; or (3) “the state court 
decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented to the state court.”  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 417 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  If the state court has adjudicated a 
petitioner’s claim on the merits, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 
                                                                                                                                                             
review of the District Court’s decision is plenary.  See Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
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evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 
of the doubt.”3  Id.  (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
III. 
A state court decision is “contrary to clearly established law if it applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth in the [Supreme] Court’s cases or if it confronts a 
set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Court and 
nevertheless arrives at a result different from the Court’s precedent.”  Id. (citing Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).  Because the Superior Court’s decision analyzed 
the sentence for an abuse of discretion, it contradicts Pearce.
4
   
Under Pearce and its progeny, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness applies 
when a defendant receives a more severe sentence after having exercised his due process 
rights to appeal.  See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982).  This 
presumption is limited to those cases where the circumstances demonstrate a “reasonable 
likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part 
                                                 
3
 If, however, a claim is not “adjudicated on the merits in State court,” we review 
it de novo, without giving AEDPA deference to the state court.  See Simmons v. Beard, 
590 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 2009).  The parties dispute whether Balsavage’s constitutional 
due process claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court such that the deferential 
standard of § 2254(d) applies.  We assume, without deciding, that Balsavage’s due 
process claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court. 
4
 The Superior Court concluded that Balsavage’s sentence did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion under Pennsylvania law because the Gagnon court “thoroughly 
explained its rationale and its concerns, which led to the imposition of the sentence it 
deemed appropriate.”  App. 337-38.   
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of the sentencing authority.”5  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Thus, if a judge imposes a harsher sentence after a 
successful appeal or collateral attack and the circumstances suggest a reasonable 
likelihood of vindictiveness, then “the reasons for [the increased sentence] must 
affirmatively appear.”  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135-36 (1980) (applying 
Pearce outside the context of retrial). 
The presumption of vindictiveness “may be overcome only by objective 
information in the record justifying the increased sentence,” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374, 
that sheds “new light upon the defendant’s life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and 
moral propensities.”  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723.  This information includes both 
“identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding,” id. at 726, and newly discovered information about conduct that 
occurred before the original sentencing that objectively supports an increased sentence.  
See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 141 (1986).   
The Superior Court’s decision, applying only Pennsylvania law, was contrary to 
this clearly established Supreme Court precedent because it reviewed the resentencing for 
an abuse of discretion instead of applying a presumption of vindictiveness or considering 
the possibility that such a presumption applied.  The Gagnon court’s reliance at 
                                                 
5
 Absent “such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to 
prove actual vindictiveness . . . .”  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989). 
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sentencing on “the fact that [Balsavage] appealed every decision and sentence [the] Court 
ever imposed on [him],” App. 236, suggests “actual vindictiveness on the part of the 
sentencing authority.”  Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.  Moreover, that Balsavage’s current 
sentence exceeds his original sentence by a factor of seven further shows the reasonable 
likelihood that it is the product of judicial vindictiveness.  In light of these circumstances, 
the Superior Court’s failure to apply a presumption of vindictiveness was contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent. 
Furthermore, the Superior Court did not apply Pearce and its progeny to determine 
whether the resentencing record contains objectively derogatory information about events 
post-dating the original sentencing or newly discovered, objectively derogatory 
information about events pre-dating the original sentencing.  As the Gagnon court 
acknowledged, Balsavage had been incarcerated since the time of his original sentencing 
and hence there was “virtually nothing . . . new or different from the time of the prior 
sentencing, as far as the background information.”  App. 234.  As the Superior Court 
recognized, the only change between the original sentencing and the resentencing was 
that Balsavage’s responses to the sentencing judge’s queries corroborated some of the 
facts on which the Gagnon court relied in imposing the original sentence.  This did not 
provide new evidence to support a sevenfold increase in Balsavage’s sentence.  See 
Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant 
asserts his right to testify clearly does not negatively reflect on the defendant’s life, 
health, habits, conduct or moral propensities in such a way as to justify the imposition of 
9 
 
an increased sentence.” (citations omitted)).  Thus, the Superior Court’s focus on the 
Gagnon court’s discretion without consideration of Pearce and the presumption of 
vindictiveness was contrary to Supreme Court precedent,
6
 and as a result, Balsavage is 
presently detained “in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(a).  
IV. 
 Having concluded that Balsavage has met his burden of showing that his current 
sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness, we must consider the appropriate 
remedy.  In reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court “does not review 
a judgment, but the lawfulness of the petitioner’s custody simpliciter.”  Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991).  Indeed, the federal court “does not have power to 
directly intervene in the process of the [state] tribunal which has incorrectly subjected the 
petitioner to the custody of the respondent official.”  Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 301 
(3d Cir. 1988); see also McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 
2007); Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1996).  As it relates to resentencing, 
the federal court may only “condition the issuance of a writ, which releases the body of 
                                                 
6
 Although the Superior Court did not identify Pearce or its progeny as the 
governing precedent, it did acknowledge that Balsavage’s sentence would be problematic 
if the Gagnon court demonstrated a vindictive purpose.  Even if that general discussion of 
vindictiveness under Pennsylvania law could be said to be an “identifi[cation of] the 
correct governing principle” from Supreme Court precedent, Blystone, 664 F.3d at 417, 
its conclusion in this case would also rest upon an unreasonable application of the law to 
the record here. 
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the prisoner from custody obtained through unconstitutional means, upon the state’s 
[imposition of a sentence] that comports with constitu[t]ional dictates.”  Henderson v. 
Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 Because it is possible that Balsavage could be resentenced above his original 
sentence in a manner that comports with due process, we conclude that imposing a cap on 
Balsavage’s new sentence would impermissibly limit the state court’s exercise of 
sentencing discretion and exceed the federal court’s authority to act on the body of a 
habeas petitioner.
7
  Consequently, although we agree with the District Court that 
Balsavage’s present sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness in violation of 
Pearce, we will vacate the District Court’s remedy with instructions to conditionally grant 
the writ of habeas corpus unless Balsavage is sentenced within 120 days in accordance 
with the Due Process Clause and the law interpreting it. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order in part, vacate 
in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                                                 
7
 In fashioning a remedy, the District Court relied in part on Jacobs, 616 F.2d 
1251, in which we held that a habeas petitioner’s sentence on a second conviction 
violated Pearce and directed that the petitioner be resentenced to a term not to exceed his 
original sentence.  Jacobs, however, explicitly adopted the procedure used in Frank v. 
Blackburn, 605 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1979), and that decision was subsequently vacated by 
the Fifth Circuit en banc.  646 F.2d 873 (1980).  Our subsequent precedent describing the 
relief permissible under § 2254 provides that a habeas court should not interfere with the 
state criminal process more than is necessary to ensure compliance with constitutional 
law.  See, e.g., McKeever, 486 F.3d at 85; Dickerson, 90 F.3d at 92; Barry, 864 F.2d at 
301. 
